



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 DEC 1976

Nato 337.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary General Luns

TIME: 0900-0930 hours, 7 December 1976


- PLACE: Office of the Secretary General of NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
- PARTICIPANTS: Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, United States Honorable Josef Luns, Secretary General of NATO Honorable Robert Strausz-Hupe, United States Ambassador to NATO Deputy Secretary General Paolo Pansa Cedronio, NATO Eugene McAuliffe, ASD/ISA, United States Paul van Campen, Director of the Private Office, Office of the Secretary General, NATO John King, Special Assistant to the Secretary General, NATO (Notetaker) Colonel Elmer T. Brooks, USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Notetaker)

<u>Secretary General Luns</u> and <u>Secretary Rumsfeld</u> exchanged greetings, and Secretary Rumsfeld presented to Secretary General Luns the original and a plaque-mounted replica of a personal letter from President Ford and an engraved silver tray from himself.

<u>Secretary Rumsfeld</u> initiated the discussion by mentioning that he met with President Ford on 4 December 1976 on the FY 1978 Defense budget and that the transition team for the incoming administration is in place and the transition is proceeding smoothly and cooperatively.

Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio inquired whether or not the press reports of a final decision on the B-l are accurate.

<u>Secretary Rumsfeld</u> responded that the **DoD** had just reached decision to cornmence limited production, then went on to summarize the history of the B-l \sim acquisition process. He indicated that month-by-month outlays through 1 July 1977, and quarterly outlays thereafter were prescribed in order to





3





facilitate an unhurried, well thought out full production decision by the new President. While citing the U.S.' need for a newer manned bomber in the **1980's**, the Secretary cautioned that the B-l should be considered in the context of our overall strategic requirements. <u>Secretary General Luns</u> asked if the limited production decision had been coordinated with the transition team, to which Secretary Rumsfeld responded that it had not.

<u>Secretary General Luns</u> then stated that there is "unhappiness" in the Eurogroup concerning the "two-way street." <u>Mr. van **Campen**</u> recalled that the press had reported that the British had attacked the French in the EPG.

Secretary General Luns stated that he would be somewhat "gloomy" in the DPC meeting after listening to General **Haig's** report. Warning time is particularly bothersome to him. He added that the European countries should be making a greater contribution.

Secretary General Luns then said that he had in mind a question for effect to ask John Hughes (US DIA) during Hughes' intelligence briefing in the restricted session. It concerns the impact of the loss of the Turkish radar sites as a source of valuable intelligence on Soviet capabilities. MOD Møller, Luns added, was disappointed that the left-wingers in the Danish government did not want to receive the briefing.

<u>Secretary Rumsfeld</u> noted that the Soviets will look for the Alliance's weakest spot, then exploit it. This could come in the form of either reinforced or unreinforced attack. If we presume a 20-30 day warning time, we may be unprepared to counter an attack following little or no warning.


Citing the example of the Soviet intervention in Angola as a test of the West's will, <u>Secretary General Luns</u> said that Soviet leaders have power without responsibility for its use. We do not. Thus, the Soviets have unlimited formulas to use as the situation demands. <u>Mr. van Campen</u> added that there is now a good chance of a second and third gamble by the Soviets since their Angola gamble proved successful.

<u>Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio</u> remarked that the USSR can accuse NATO of escalation of tensions if we increase our alert posture or advance the position of our troops. <u>Secretary Rumsfeld</u> stated that that is the reason the United States is trying to do some things during stable periods so that they will not come as a surprise and be construed as **escalatory** by our adversaries if done in times of crisis.

<u>Secretary General Luns</u> mentioned that he planned to discuss Soviet civil defense in the second restricted session, adding that it could change the balance if the Soviets felt that they could sustain themselves in a nuclear war.

<u>Ambassador Strausz-Hupe</u> interjected that he does not concern himself with analyzing the personalities of the Soviet leaders because we do not know enough about the Soviet internal system to be able to know or predict their intentions.





Secretary Genral Luns, in response to a question from Secretary Rumsfeld, stated that Spain should be invited to join NATO soon after democratic elections are held. Paraphrasing a previous statement by Ambassador Strausz-Hupe, Secretary General Luns commented, 'We should not be the judges of other **people's** democracy." Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio added that we will have to consider that it will be Spain's decision to make.

Turning to Portugal, Secretary General Luns said that the Portuguese representative to whom he had talked the day prior stated it is militarily essential to have Spain in NATO. As an aside, Secretary General Luns said no NATO country supported Portugal morally in her struggles with her colonies and that NATO nations are being forced by pressure from other nations to adhere to principles to which those nations do not. Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio suggested that this is a source of strength rather than weakness for the Alliance. Secretary General Luns disagreed.

Changing the subject, Secretary Rumsfeld asked about AWACS. Secretary General Luns and Deputy Secretary **Pansa** Cedronio commented as follows: If the DPC makes a decision at the meeting, Norway and Benelux will take a positive position; LJK has the NIMROD; both the Greeks and the Turks are expending a major portion of their defense budgets on one another, and their quarrels will be laid at the feet of NATO in the form of blackmail.

Mr. van **Campen** concluded the discussion by noting that the Turks' patience is wearing thin.

APPROVED BY:

Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense

21 December 1976 DATE:

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3

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